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I. Introduction 
History teaches us that where a government and its citizens are financially 
depends on the sort of economic and political decisions that were made in the past. 
This report examines the financial position of Pennsylvania’s state and local 
governmental sectors, which we take to mean the long-term liabilities of 
Pennsylvania’s public sector in relation to its long-term ability to finance them. We 
take this historical stock-taking to presage the future. Here, we review a few 
aggregate measures of Pennsylvania’s declining economic importance, and then turn 
to the main research questions.   
By way of summary, we observe that one’s conclusion about the future 
depends on how far one is willing to look out. Generally, Pennsylvania’s public 
sector liabilities grow very dramatically after 2010, and the implied tax rates to 
amortize rapidly rising debt service and long term obligations are dramatically higher 
than currently observed. Further, in the case of several of the state’s largest 
municipalities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, there is reason to believe that their ability 
to leave their distressed status and oversight of various receivership boards is quite 
limited. Moreover, there is good reason to expect that more municipalities will join 
this class of distressed municipalities in the foreseeable future. 
 
A. Background: Pennsylvania’s Population and Income 
 
Pennsylvania was one of the earliest settled colonies of the Middle Atlantic 
States in 1643, and composed 11 percent of the U.S. population through the middle of 
the 19th century. Thereafter, Pennsylvania’s share of the population has continued to 
decline (See Table 1).  It was most important in terms of U.S. population share in 
1800, and most important in terms of share of the U.S. urban population in 1970. 
Over the last half century, Pennsylvania’s population increased only 16 
percent while that of the U.S. increased 57.8 percent. This decline in general 
importance was accompanied by a very middle of the states standard of living. 
Median family income since World War II has been within a few percentage points of 
the U.S. median family income. (See Table 2).  
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  TABLE 1.  ACTUAL AND PREDICTED PENNSYLVANIA POPULATION: 1790-2030 
Year 
Pennsylvania 
Population 
U.S. 
Population 
% 
Pennsylvania 
% 
Urban 
Pennsylvania 
Land Area as 
% of U.S. 
1790 434,373 3,929,214 11.1% 10.1% 5.2% 
1800 602,365 5,308,483 11.3% 11.3% 5.2% 
1810 810,091 7,239,881 11.2% 12.8% 2.7% 
1820 1,049,458 9,638,453 10.9% 13.0% 2.6% 
1830 1,348,233 12,868,020 10.5% 15.3% 2.6% 
1840 1,724,033 17,069,453 10.1% 17.9% 2.6% 
1850 2,311,786 23,191,876 10.0% 23.6% 1.5% 
1860 2,906,215 31,443,321 9.2% 30.8% 1.5% 
1870 3,521,951 39,818,449 8.8% 37.3% 1.5% 
1880 4,282,891 50,155,783 8.5% 41.6% 1.5% 
1890 5,258,014 62,947,714 8.4% 48.6% 1.5% 
1900 6,302,115 75,994,575 8.3% 54.7% 1.5% 
1910 7,665,111 91,972,266 8.3% 60.4% 1.5% 
1920 8,720,017 105,710,620 8.2% 65.1% 1.5% 
1930 9,631,350 122,775,046 7.8% 67.8% 1.3% 
1940 9,900,180 131,669,275 7.5% 66.5% 1.3% 
1950 10,498,012 150,697,361 7.0% 70.5% 1.3% 
1960 11,319,366 178,464,236 6.3% 71.6% 1.3% 
1970 11,800,766 203,302,031 5.8% 71.5% 1.3% 
1980 11,864,720 226,542,199 5.2% 69.3% 1.3% 
1990 11,881,643 248,709,873 4.8% 68.9% 1.3% 
2000 12,281,054 281,421,906 4.4% 77.1% 1.3% 
2010 12,584,487 308,935,581 4.1%  
2020 12,787,354 335,804,546 3.8%  
2030 12,768,184 363,584,435 3.5%  
 
 
TABLE 2.  PENNSYLVANIA’S MEDIAN INCOME:  
1959-1999 
 U.S. PA PA/U.S. 
1999 $50,046 $49,184 0.982 
1989 $35,225 $34,856 0.989 
1979 $19,917 $19,995 1.004 
1969 $9,586 $9,554 0.997 
1959 $5,660 $5,719 1.010 
Source: Decennial Census, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census. 
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B. Background: Pennsylvania’s Governmental Units 
 
From the outset, Pennsylvania was devoted to local autonomy. A 
Commonwealth, Pennsylvania has always had disproportionately more local 
governments than other colonies or subsequent states. While Pennsylvania’s share of 
the U.S. population has declined over the last 50 years, its share of governmental 
units has remained relatively constant at about 5.7 percent. (See Table 3). 
 
TABLE 3.  GOVERNMENTAL UNITS BY STATE,  
1942-2002 
Year U.S. PA 
PA 
as % U.S. 
1942 155,116 5,263 3.4% 
1952 116,807 5,156 4.4% 
1962 91,237 6,202 6.8% 
1967 82,299 4,999 6.1% 
1972 78,269 4,936 6.3% 
1977 79,913 5,247 6.6% 
1982 81,831 5,199 6.4% 
1987 83,237 4,957 6.0% 
1992 85,006 5,159 6.1% 
1997 87,504 5,071 5.8% 
2002 87,576 5,032 5.7% 
Source: Census of Governments, U.S. Bureau 
of the Census (2002). 
 
Pennsylvania, like many states witnessed a remarkable consolidation of 
school districts in the 1950’s and 1960’s; the number of independent school districts 
dropped from 2,506 in 1952 to 516 in 2002. This decline in school districts was about 
offset by the remarkable increases in the number of special districts and primarily 
authorities which numbered 29 in 1952 and now number 1,885 in 2002. Note that 
Pennsylvania has never accorded property taxing authority to its public authorities, 
unlike other some other states  (See Table 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.  PENNSYLVANIA STATE AND LOCAL TAXES ($BILLIONS, PER CAPITA, %) 
Panel A 
Year 
PA State and 
Local Taxes 
$Billions 
PA State Taxes 
$Billions 
PA Local Taxes 
$Billions 
PA State 
and 
Local 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
PA State 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
PA Local 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
US State 
and Local 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
US State 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
 
 
US Local 
Taxes 
Per 
Capita 
1972 $6,225,858,000 $3,862,969,000 $2,362,889,000 $523 $324 $198 $526 $287 $238 
1982 $13,223,855,000 $8,185,625,000 $5,038,230,000 $1,113 $689 $424 $1,153 $704 $449 
1992 $26,282,781,000 $16,269,988,000 $10,012,793,000 $2,189 $1,355 $834 $2,188 $1,294 $894 
2002 $37,626,620,000 $22,135,537,000 $15,491,083,000 $3,052 $1,795 $1,256 $3,149 $1,863 $1,287 
Panel B 
Year 
PA State and 
Local Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income 
PA State Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income 
PA Local Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income 
 
US State 
and Local 
Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income 
 
US State 
Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income 
 
US Local 
Taxes 
as % 
Personal 
Income    
1972 11.2% 6.9% 4.2% 11.2% 6.1% 5.1%    
1982 9.4% 5.8% 3.6% 9.7% 5.9% 3.8%    
1992 10.3% 6.4% 3.9% 10.5% 6.2% 4.3%    
2002 9.8% 5.8% 4.0% 10.2% 6.1% 4.2%    
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TABLE 5.  LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY TYPE: PENNSYLVANIA VS. U.S., 1942-2003 
-------Special Districts------ 
Year 
PA 
Counties 
PA 
Municipalities 
PA 
Townships 
PA School 
Districts 
with 
Property 
Tax 
w/o 
Property 
Tax 
Dependent 
SDs 
1940    
1952 66 990 1,564 2,506 0 29  
1962 66 1,003 1,555 2,179 0 1,398  
1972 66 1,012 1,552 528 0 1,777  
1982 66 1,019 1,549 514 0 2,050  
1992 66 1,022 1,548 516 0 2,006  
2002 66 1,018 1,546 516 0 1,885
-------Special Districts------ 
Year 
U.S. 
Counties 
U.S. 
Municipalities 
U.S. 
Townships 
U.S. 
School 
Districts 
with 
Property 
Tax 
w/o 
Property 
Tax 
Dependent 
SDs 
1952 3,052 16,807 17,202 67,355 12,340
1962 3,043 17,997 17,144 34,678 18,323
1972 3,044 18,517 16,991 15,781 23,885
1982 3,041 19,076 16,734 14,851 12,241 16,347 1,538
1992 3,043 19,279 16,656 14,422 14,951 16,604 1,412
2002 3,034 19,429 16,504 13,506
(only one value provided) 
35,052 1,508
 
 
With a relatively moderate standard of living, stagnant population and 
numerous governmental units, Pennsylvania continues to impose significant tax 
burdens on its population and businesses.  
It is well known that states have sought to circumvent constitutional 
limitations on indebtedness through the use of state authorities.1 Local governments, 
when empowered to establish local public authorities, have similarly pursued this 
indirect access to the capital market. Recall that governance of public authorities is 
typically accomplished by appointed rather than elected boards. Table 6 shows the 
importance of local authority debt and ranks the states by their share of total local 
debt. In 2001-02 Pennsylvania’s public authorities and special districts, ranked 3rd 
highest overall, were responsible for 48.6 percent of total local debt, and $62.8 billion 
                                                          
1 See Bunch (1988, 1991). 
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TABLE 6.  ROLE OF SPECIAL DISTRICT AND LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITY DEBT AMONG THE STATES 
2001-02 
Rank State 
Total Long Debt 
2001-02 
($1,000's) 
% Share 
Special 
% 
County 
% 
Municipal 
% 
Township 
1 Nebraska  $5,691 52.6% 4.5% 23.5% – 
2 Utah   $8,520 50.8% 11.2% 21.9% – 
3 Pennsylvania   $62,827 48.6% 7.4% 13.1% 2.4%
4 Washington  $32,008 46.4% 12.2% 21.0% – 
5 Indiana  $14,615 45.9% 7.1% 36.7% 0.3%
6 Georgia   $26,058 36.0% 20.5% 28.6% – 
7 Massachusetts   $20,106 31.0% 0.0% 31.3% 33.2%
8 North Carolina   $22,332 29.9% 42.9% 27.2% – 
9 New Jersey  $25,497 26.9% 16.5% 17.7% 17.4%
10 California  $138,037 25.7% 14.8% 45.7% – 
11 Colorado   $21,299 24.3% 8.7% 43.5% – 
12 South Carolina   $12,757 23.5% 32.6% 15.0% – 
13 Wyoming   $1,090 22.9% 42.2% 20.7% – 
14 Maine  $2,025 22.9% 2.7% 31.8% 25.6%
15 Arizona   $22,259 20.9% 17.4% 40.6% – 
16 Minnesota   $25,602 20.0% 6.9% 43.6% 0.3%
17 Florida   $70,010 19.5% 40.2% 27.4% – 
18 Oregon   $11,159 19.5% 13.9% 35.5% – 
19 Illinois  $46,176 19.5% 8.0% 44.5% 0.2%
20 Alabama   $12,652 18.8% 20.8% 44.9% – 
21 Texas  $98,801 18.7% 13.6% 37.5% – 
22 Delaware  $1,494 18.7% 41.9% 26.8% – 
23 Virginia  $21,637 18.6% 43.1% 38.1% – 
24 Nevada   $12,105 14.9% 45.5% 12.8% – 
25 West Virginia   $3,547 14.1% 59.5% 20.4% – 
26 Tennessee   $17,500 13.6% 38.7% 46.9% – 
27 Vermont  $744 11.6%  38.7% 16.5%
28 South Dakota   $1,143 10.6% 9.1% 40.2% – 
29 Connecticut  $6,984 9.9%  43.5% 44.4%
30 Kentucky   $19,955 9.3% 51.9% 28.2% – 
31 Wisconsin   $15,457 8.9% 10.8% 40.3% 2.5%
32 Missouri  $11,552 8.4% 8.2% 50.1% – 
33 New York  $107,339 8.2% 12.1% 64.5% 4.5%
34 Idaho   $1,440 7.8% 11.7% 31.7% – 
35 Mississippi  $5,774 7.6% 44.5% 23.1% – 
36 Arkansas   $5,752 6.8% 16.3% 50.0% – 
37 Ohio   $31,335 6.1% 41.8% 30.5% 0.4%
38 Rhode Island   $1,489 5.8%  57.8% 34.9%
39 Montana   $1,211 5.6% 10.9% 62.3% – 
40 North Dakota   $1,232 5.4% 21.7% 58.9% – 
Table 6 continues next page…
 
The Financial Position of Pennsylvania’s Public Sectors:  
Past, Present, and Future   
 
 
 7
TABLE 6 (CONTINUED).  ROLE OF SPECIAL DISTRICT AND LOCAL PUBLIC AUTHORITY DEBT AMONG 
THE STATES 2001-02 
Rank State 
Total Long Debt 
2001-02 
($1,000's) 
% Share 
Special 
% 
County 
% 
Municipal 
% 
Township 
41 Kansas  $10,025 4.3% 17.8% 48.4% – 
42 Alaska   $3,338 4.3% 33.2% 62.5% – 
43 Iowa   $5,781 4.2% 9.5% 63.1% – 
44 Oklahoma   $6,031 3.9% 14.6% 64.1% – 
45 Louisiana  $11,753 3.9% 36.4% 40.8% – 
46 Michigan   $32,248 3.8% 17.5% 32.5% 1.9%
47 Maryland   $13,354 3.3% 80.8% 15.9% – 
48 New Hampshire   $1,825 2.1% 1.4% 53.8% 13.0%
49 New Mexico   $4,110 1.3% 17.1% 58.7% – 
50 Hawaii   $2,792 0.0% 17.7% 82.3% – 
    
 Total U.S. $1,038,468 21.0% 19.8% 37.9% 2.2%
 Average  16.9% 22.5% 38.8% 13.2%
 Median  13.9% 16.5% 38.4% 4.5%
 
 
overall. While California’s total local debt was much larger at $138 billion,2 public 
authorities and special districts’ debt was only 25.7 percent of total local debt. Below 
we will pay special attention to Pennsylvania’s local public authority debt. 
 
C. Research Questions and Organization of Report 
 
With these essential facts about Pennsylvania’s public sector, we move to the 
essential research questions of this report: 
 
● What has been the financial position of this public sector over the past ten 
years in terms of the present value of liabilities and assets? How does this 
picture change as the financial position is redefined in terms of broader 
concepts of public responsibilities? 
 
● What are the prospects for the financial position of Pennsylvania’s public 
sector over the next 25 years under optimistic, conservative, and 
pessimistic economic assumptions?  
 
                                                          
2 On a per-capita basis, however, California had less special district and authority per-capita debt 
at $1,013 compared to Pennsylvania at $2,544. It should be kept in mind, however, that these are 
averages, and are much higher in some Pennsylvania local governments such as Pittsburgh. 
 
The Financial Position of Pennsylvania’s Public Sectors:  
Past, Present, and Future   
 
 
 8 
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 develops an analytical 
framework for the long-term evaluation of the financial position of a state and its 
local governments, and how the prospective analysis under alternative economic 
assumptions can be constructed. Section 3 discusses the legal and constitutional 
background for state and local finance in Pennsylvania, and makes some comparative 
remarks about the extent of local autonomy.  Section 4 discusses data sources and the 
historical results for the past 10 years. Section 5 presents the forecasts under the three 
essential economic assumptions, and Section 6 concludes. 
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II. A Framework for Evaluating the Financial Position of a 
State and its Local Governments 
 
Just like individuals who seek to minimize their federal tax liabilities, state 
and local governments and their instrumentalities seek to issue federally tax favored 
or exempt debt in order to reduce the cost of borrowing. The term instrumentalities 
should be thought of rather broadly since it includes not only subsidiary 
governmental organizations such as local authorities, which often have their own 
independent ability to issue debt, but also private organizations that partner with local 
governments for economic development and other purposes. The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 severely limited these activities; however, they continue to flourish and evolve. 
In many respects the explosion of public authorities throughout the U.S., 
chronicled above, from 12,000 in 1952 to 25,000 in 2002, reflects moves by local 
governments to circumvent state limitations on their debt issuance through the 
creation of quasi-independent organizations. Also, such authorities can set charges 
and fees without the same political scrutiny that their parent organizations and parent 
legislative bodies must withstand. 
  
A. Liabilities of the Public Sector: General 
 
Since our interest is in the long-run liabilities of Pennsylvania’s public sector 
in comparison to its capacity to finance them, we must classify both. With respect to 
debt, per se, we may distinguish between Full Faith and Credit Debt (FFC debt), 
Fee/Revenue Related Debt, Tax Anticipation/Revenue Bonds, Intergovernmental 
Revenue Anticipation Bonds, and Non-guaranteed Bonds (NG). It is desirable to 
know not only if the debt is secured through a dedicated revenue stream, but also if 
any debt issue has been insured through a third party which may be a private 
insurance company, an insurance pool, or through credit enhancements that may link 
unsecured to revenue debt so that the former is partially self-insured.3 With respect to 
the long-run assets associated with debt, we may enquire about the predictability of 
                                                          
3 A number of states organize municipal debt pools, assist through the provision of state insurance, 
and/or heavily supervise municipal borrowing to ensure that only credit-worthy local projects are 
undertaken.  
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anticipated funding flows, and the adequacy of existing sinking funds and reserves 
accumulated to pay off such bonded indebtedness. The adequacy or solvency of the 
entities under study entails a comparison of the present value of outflows with the 
present value of inflows.  
Pennsylvania’s public sector has additional liabilities that result from long-
term obligations and contracts which behave or have the economic character of 
bonded indebtedness. State and local pension contracts that are typically defined 
benefit in character behave not only like debt in the sense they are long-term 
obligations that must be honored, but actually are more like index bonds whose 
liabilities rise over time since the obligation is typically based on 2 percent of the 
average of the last three years’ salary times the years of service of the prospective 
retiree.4 Similarly, obligations to continue to pay those injured on the job under 
workmen’s compensation can be viewed to be analogous to long-term indebtedness 
since those with permanent disabilities are eligible and receive compensation for long 
periods of time. Long-term leases are another contractual example of an activity that 
behaves like bonded indebtedness. 
Construction of new public buildings and publicly supported entertainment 
facilities such as stadiums and concert halls are typically associated with bond 
issuance which in turn are routinely reported. Similarly, road construction is usually 
financed by a combination of bonded indebtedness and taxation. Related to these new 
capital initiatives are deferred investments in infrastructure needs which are 
periodically measured by external organizations. As we shall see below, in the case of 
deferred bridge repair, the amounts that should be annually expended in Pennsylvania 
are quite large. 
State and federal law obligates Pennsylvania to spend on public education and 
public health, as well as spend to meet federal and state environmental standards. The 
notion here is that both human and physical capital require annual investments to 
meet agreed upon or mandated objectives, and the long-term under-investment of 
resources leads to deficits that can be viewed as analogous to the under-funding of 
                                                          
4 See Furgeson, Strauss, and Vogt (2006) for a careful analysis of how Pennsylvania teachers 
respond to  retirement incentives. 
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public pensions. That is, Pennsylvania has made promises through legislation to 
ensure a free and efficient public education, but is not, in terms of outcomes, or 
physical infrastructure providing the resources to attain these desired results. 
 
B. Classification of Governmental Indebtedness 
  
At the conceptual level, state governments generally can issue short-term debt 
to smooth out there cash flow in anticipation of taxes, intergovernmental transfers 
from the federal government, and in some instances long-term debt offerings and 
restructurings. The particulars of whether or not the debt reflects the full faith and 
credit (FFC)5 of the state government, agency, or quasi independent commission or 
public authority are of interest, as is the federal tax exemption status of such debt. 
The state governments may limit their debt issuance by statute or constitutionally.6  
Other important characteristics of state indebtedness are whether or not the debt has 
been insured by a third party, is secured by an ongoing revenue stream, is associated 
with a sinking fund for repayment of principal, the coupon rate and maturity 
structure. 
Local indebtedness follows the pattern in the state, although the use of public 
authorities to circumvent state limitations on local debt may get more complicated.  
 
C. Other Long-Term Public Obligations 
 
The financial position of a public sector depends not only on its guaranteed 
and non-guaranteed long-term indebtedness in relation to the resources available to 
amortize them, but also on other long-term obligations which are contractual and 
therefore obligatory. The most prominent other long-term obligation involves 
promises to pay retirement benefits in conjunction with collective bargaining 
agreements. Most state and local retirement systems continue to be defined benefit 
rather than defined contribution in nature, and typically rely on 3 years of average 
salary to measure the replacement target, and years of service times a parameter to 
                                                          
5 The U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division distinguishes between FFC debt and what 
they characterize as non-guaranteed debt (NG). 
6 See Section 3 below for a detailed discussion of Pennsylvania’s constitutional and statutory 
limitations on debt issuance. 
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determine the replacement rate. Other foreseeable long-term obligations include the 
payment of health benefits and worker’s compensation for those permanently 
disabled. 
Deferred maintenance of capital infrastructure is difficult to measure, but in 
the case of transportation infrastructure (bridges, roads) periodically addressed by the 
American Society of Civil Engineers on a state by state basis.  
More difficult to measure but of widespread interest are capital needs to 
maintain a given level of environmental quality for drinking water, the air, and water 
supplies and streams more generally.  
 
D. Financing Long-Term Public Long-Term Liabilities  
 
We shall in our analysis of long-term liabilities calculate what the financing 
requirements of Pennsylvania’s long-term obligations in relation to state-wide 
personal income, and in relation to the state-wide property tax base. The former may 
be interpreted to be the implicit personal income tax rate needed to amortize the 
various liabilities on a systematic basis, while the latter may be interpreted to be the 
state-wide real-estate tax rate needed to amortize various long-term liabilities. 
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III. The Legal Framework for Debt Issuance by Pennsylvania’s 
State & Local Governments 
 
A. Evolution of Pennsylvania’s Constitutional and Legal 
Limitations on State and Municipal Debt 
 
Borrowing to support both operating and capital costs of government are as 
old as government itself, and as  Webber and Wildavsky (1986: 242) remind us:  
 
“…before states had access to the growing market for capital, whichever 
[national] government ran out of money first had to surrender. Without funds 
to pay its sailors and unable to borrow, England’s navy met defeat in the 
Anglo-Dutch War of 1667.” 
 
The exorbitant exuberances of 19th century government-supported economic 
development activities (canals and railroads in particular) were followed by notable 
state and local government bankruptcies. State constitutional amendments were 
needed to restore investor confidence in the security of state bonds, and such 
amendments frequently isolated the states from their constitutional children’s 
borrowing in order to immunize state credit ratings.   
Pennsylvania was relatively early among the original states to limit through 
its constitution overall state indebtedness.  Prior to the Civil War, Pennsylvania 
limited state indebtedness to $750,000, and in the 1857 amendment to its constitution 
(Section 5 and Section 6 of Article XI) prohibited the Commonwealth from taking on 
any private or municipal debts, except when local governmental instance of debt were 
locally incurred to stop a local insurrection: 
 
“The Commonwealth shall not assume the debt, or any part thereof, of any 
county, city, borough, incorporated town, township or any similar general 
purpose unit of government unless such debt shall have been incurred to 
enable the Commonwealth to suppress insurrection or to assist the 
Commonwealth in the discharge of any portion of its present indebtedness. 
(Amendments of 1857; Section 5 of Article XI of Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1838) 
 
“The credit of the Commonwealth shall not be pledged or loaned to any 
individual, company, corporation or association nor shall the Commonwealth 
become a joint owner or stockholder in any company, corporation or 
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association. (Amendments of 1857; Section 6 of Article XI of Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1838) 
 
Constitutional limitations on local debt issuance in relation to the assessed 
value of property arose in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874: 
 
“The debt of any municipality, city, borough, township, school district or 
other municipality or incorporated district, except as herein provided, shall 
never exceed seven per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable 
property therein, nor shall any such municipality or district incur any new 
debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding two per centum 
upon such assessed valuation of property, without the assent of the electors 
thereof at a public election, in such manner as shall be provided by law; but 
any city, the debt of which now exceeds seven per centum of such assessed 
valuation, may be authorized by law to increase the same three per centum, in 
the aggregate at any one time, upon such valuation. (Section 8 of Title IX of 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874). 
 
On November, 1918, the above article was amended to permit Philadelphia to 
be under a 10 percent limitation and also enabled to issue 50 year debt as long as 
accompanied by a sinking fund mechanism. The method of measuring Philadelphia’s 
debt limitation was refined in constitutional amendments of 1920, and the debt limit 
raised to 13.5 percent in the constitutional amendment to Section 8, Article IX on 
November 6, 1951. The limit in the rate of growth in Philadelphia’s debt, previously 
2 percent/year was increased to 3 percent/year. 
The growth in municipal capital infrastructure projects in the early 1900’s led 
to important exceptions being granted in the calculation of municipal debt limitations. 
Section 15 was added on November 4, 1913 to Article IX of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1874, and provided: 
 
“No obligations which have been heretofore issued, or which may hereafter 
be issued, by any county or municipality, other than Philadelphia, to provide 
for the construction or acquisition of waterworks, subways, underground 
railways or street railways, or the appurtenances thereof, shall be considered 
as a debt of a municipality, within the meaning of section eight of article nine 
of the Constitution of Pennsylvania or of this amendment, if the net revenue 
derived from said property for a period of five years, either before or after the 
acquisition thereof, or, where the same is constructed by the county or 
municipality, after the completion thereof, shall have been sufficient to pay 
interest and sinking-fund charges during said period upon said obligations, or 
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if the said obligations shall be secured by liens upon the respective properties, 
and shall impose no municipal liability. 
 
As Pennsylvania continued to grow, and face various challenges it increased 
the state’s constitutional authority to borrow for budgetary purposes ($25 million 
bonded indebtedness per year was constitutionally enabled in 1933 to fund budget 
deficits; $500 million of bonded indebtedness was enabled in 1945 to compensate 
World War II veterans and their families; $150 million of bonded indebtedness was 
enabled in 1967 to compensate Korean War veterans and their families; $500 million 
of bonded indebtedness was also enabled in 1967 for water and reclamation projects.   
Constitutional limitations on local indebtedness were replaced in the 
Constitution of 1968 through the delegation to the General Assembly of authority to 
impose such limitations by law; however, previous limitations based on the ratio of 
debt to assessed value of real property were replaced by limitations based on the ratio 
of debt to municipal revenues: 
“Subject only to the restrictions imposed by this section, the General 
Assembly shall prescribe the debt limits of all units of local government 
including municipalities and school districts. For such purposes, the debt limit 
base shall be a percentage of the total revenue, as defined by the General 
Assembly, of the unit of local government computed over a specific period 
immediately preceding the year of borrowing. The debt limit to be prescribed 
in every such case shall exclude all indebtedness (1) for any project to the 
extent that it is self-liquidating or self-supporting or which has heretofore 
been defined as self- liquidating or self-supporting, or (2) which has been 
approved by referendum held in such manner as shall be provided by law. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the City or County of 
Philadelphia. Any unit of local government, including municipalities and 
school districts, incurring any indebtedness, shall at or before the time of so 
doing adopt a covenant, which shall be binding upon it so long as any such 
indebtedness shall remain unpaid, to make payments out of its sinking fund or 
any other of its revenues or funds at such time and in such annual amounts 
specified in such covenant as shall be sufficient for the payment of the 
interest thereon and the principal thereof when due. (Section 10 of Article IX 
of the Constitution of 1968) 
 
This was accomplished in 1972 and refined several times (1978, and 1996) in 
Pennsylvania’s Unit Debt Act. 
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B. Current Debt Limitation Law: Pennsylvania’s Unit Debt Act 
 
Pennsylvania state law distinguishes between local debt that has been 
approved through referenda, electoral debt, and debt that has not been approved by 
direct voting, non-electoral debt and debt issued by local authorities, or so-called 
lease-rental debt.  It should be remembered that in both instances, governing boards, 
either elected or appointed by the respective municipal government, must vote to 
issue such debt, and meet certain state imposed requirements.  Electoral debt is free 
of state limitation, although the state is prohibited, as noted above, from taking on 
such liabilities of local government or its instrumentalities.  
Debt limitations imposed by the Unit Debt Act are expressed as ratios of 
certain debt to certain kinds of revenues or borrowing base of a local government.  
The borrowing base is essentially a net revenue concept and is calculated by 
subtracting from all monies received by the local government intending to borrow the 
following items: 
 
● Subsidies or reimbursements from the federal or state government by the 
cost or given on account of the particular project; 
● Revenues, user charges etc. pledged to pay off the debt; 
● Interest on sinking fund monies or reserves that are pledged to pay off the 
debt; 
● Grants and gifts designed for the project; and, 
● Non-recurring receipts such as bond proceeds and proceeds from sales of 
capital assets. 
 
 A three year moving average of the so-calculated base is then compared to 
outstanding and proposed debt, and compared to percentages which constitute the 
debt limit per se. Table 7 displays the percentage limits that the ratio of new debt to 
the three year moving average of net revenues must be less than in order for the local 
government or authority, in the case of lease-rental debt, to issue additional net debt: 
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TABLE 7.  UNIT DEBT ACT LIMITATIONS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING 
-----------------Type of Debt----------------  
Type of Local Government  
Non-Electoral 
Debt 
Lease-Rental Debt + 
Non-Electoral Debt 
Philadelphia School District 100% 200%
Counties 300% 400%
1st  Class A - 4th  Class  
School Districts 225% 225%
Any other Local Government 250% 350%
 
 
C. Pennsylvania’s Statutory Provisions for Troubled Municipalities 
and School Districts 
 
While state governments often isolate themselves from the indebtedness and 
bankruptcy risk of their constitutional creatures, that usually does not mean that the 
states are indifferent to the financial malfeasance of local governments and their 
instrumentalities. Especially in the case of public school districts, states intervene not 
only when districts are unable to meet their operating and capital obligations, but also 
now intervene, largely due to federal pressures, when academic progress or learning 
outcomes are inadequate. 
Under the Pennsylvania School Code, 24 PS-691, the Secretary of Education 
may declare a school district “distressed” and appoint an administrator to take over 
and run the district, and request that a local court appoint 2 citizens from the district 
to constitute an oversight board. Precipitating conditions include: (1) failure to pay 
teacher salaries for 90 days, (2) default on bonds or interest on bonds or long-term 
leases for 90 days, (3) illegal borrowing, and (4) accumulated deficits equal to 2 
percent or more of assessed value for 2 years or more. In the case of the Philadelphia 
school district, distressed status  may be found if (1) a budget is not adopted or 
complied with, (2) if funds are not transferred from the Philadelphia City budget to 
ensure minimum instruction in the school year, or (3) if funds are not transferred 
from the Philadelphia City I compliance with the City budget. 
 Takeover of municipal finances is generally contemplated under 
Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987.  Act 47 sets forth 11 
criteria, which if any is present, permits the Pennsylvania Department of Community 
and Economic Development to declare a municipality “distressed” and thereby 
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appoint a “coordinator” and require the distressed municipality to obtain approval 
from the coordinator of subsequent budgets. Reasons for being deemed distress 
include default on principal or interest on bonds, failure to make payroll, accumulated 
deficits over 2 years of 5 percent or more of revenues, or a decline in the level of 
municipal services. Since Pennsylvania municipal tax law imposes statutory millage 
limits by class of municipality, municipalities with declining or stagnant tax bases 
accompanied by lack of fiscal discipline can find themselves under Act 47.7 
In 1991 and in 2004, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted separate 
oversight legislation for respectively the City of Philadelphia, and the City of 
Pittsburgh. In both cases, the so-called Intergovernmental Cooperation Acts provided 
for over sight boards appointed by the General Assembly and Governor. Philadelphia 
was exempted from being under Act 47 and has been under receivership of its 
intergovernmental authority since 1991; Pittsburgh was not exempted under its 
intergovernmental cooperation legislation and has been subject to two oversight 
processes since 2004. In both instances the circumstances or triggers for oversight 
entail a finding of distress that reflect the above indicators of financial distress, e.g. 
chronic deficits, failure to pay interest or principal of bonds etc, by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Community and Economic Development. The oversight boards must 
approve proposed budgets, and may also provide relief from state public collective 
bargaining laws that require binding arbitration of final offers. 
                                                          
7 While most aspects of being under Act 47 involve the diminution of local control. a distressed 
municipality may ask its coordinator to in turn request a local municipal judge impose a commuter 
tax at a rate which the municipality and its coordinator agree to. The judge is empowered only to 
decide in favor or against the commuter tax.   
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IV. Measuring Pennsylvania’s Financial Position, 1992-2003 
 
A. Federal and Pennsylvania Data Sources and Governmental 
Demography 
 
The Governments Division of the U.S. Bureau of the Census is the federal 
data source on Pennsylvania’s public sector indebtedness. The Division is primarily 
responsible for measuring in a consistent manner state and local  finances, 
employment, and retirement systems. Every five years, the second and seventh year 
of each decade, the Division performs a Census of Governments that captures the 
financial and employment information of every state and its local governments 
(counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and special districts and 
authorities. In other years, the Division measures the same information from a large 
sample of such jurisdictions. As Table 8 indicates, the number of jurisdictions 
sampled during non-Census years is on the order of 700 or 800, while about 5,000 
jurisdictions are enumerated twice a decade.  
In order to make consistent aggregate comparisons across time, we shall 
focus on U.S. Census of Governments years of 1992, 1997, and 2002. 
 
TABLE 8.  COUNT OF PENNSYLVANIA LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN GOVERNMENTS DIVISION 
DATA BASE 1992-2003 
Year Counties Municipalities 
Townships 
and 
Boroughs 
Special 
Districts 
and 
Authorities 
School 
Districts Total 
1992 66 1022 1548 2006 516 5160
1993 40 63 60 310 256 731
1994 40 65 60 313 255 735
1995 40 65 60 307 253 727
1996 40 65 60 334 254 754
1997 66 1023 1546 1919 516 5071
1998 40 65 60 313 517 996
1999 40 65 60 305 516 987
2000 58 182 226 256 515 1238
2001 31 22 74 214 515 857
2002 61 893 1437 1183 515 4090
2003 31 21 71 166 514 804
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Over the period 1992-2003, long-term indebtedness of the state and local 
sector grew by 85.7 percent while in Pennsylvania it grew by 69 percent; however, on 
a per-capita basis, total U.S. state and local debt per-capita grew by 69 percent and 
Pennsylvania’s state and local per capita debt grew by 64 percent. 
 
A.1. State and Local Data Sources 
 
Data on the unfunded liabilities of state retirement systems are available from 
the annual reports of the Pennsylvania Employees Retirement System while data on 
the unfunded liabilities of municipal retirement systems, which are not state funded, 
are in annual reports of the Public Employee Retirement Commission. The 
Commission was established by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1984 to 
monitor and assist municipal retirement plans, and additionally in 2002 to monitor 
and assist county retirement plans. 
 
B. Measurement Results:  Historical Aggregate Liabilities 
 
We begin our analysis of Pennsylvania’s public sector long-term liabilities by 
examining historical long-term indebtedness. Table 9 shows for the three census 
years the long term indebtedness by level and type of government. State long term 
debt has grown from $12.2 billion to $19.9 billion over the 11 year period 1992-2002, 
a 60.6 percent overall increase, or 4.4 percent/year. During this period, long-term 
state debt was about 25 percent of the state and local long-term debt total. Total local 
debt grew by 72 percent, or 5.05 percent/year.  
Among local governments, school district debt grew the fastest, at 172 
percent over the 11 year period or 9.5 percent/year. Special districts and authorities 
were the single largest component of local debt, and accounted for from 54.5 percent 
of total local long term debt in 1992 to 46.5 percent of total local long term debt in 
2002. (See Table 9). 
Up until 2003, the major state retirement plans had positive situations with 
respect to the balance between the present value of their assets and liabilities. 
Pennsylvania’s Employees Retirement System, which is the teachers’ retirement plan, 
had  a  positive  balance of assets vs. liabilities until 2003. Most recently, it now has a  
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TABLE 9.  LONG-TERM DEBT OF PENNSYLVANIA’S PUBLIC SECTOR 
State + Local  1992 % 1997 % 2002 % 
State $12,448,794,000 26.4% $14,988,308,000 25.2% $19,988,693,000 25.1%
County  3,110,691,000 6.6% 4,033,643,000 9.1% 4,550,397,000 5.7%
  Municipal   5,625,073,000 11.9% 5,735,719,000 12.9% 8,042,435,000 10.1%
  Townships  481,328,000 1.0% 1,022,806,000 2.3% 1,430,651,000 1.8%
Special 
Districts and 
Authorities 18,898,573,000 40.1% 22,162,129,000 49.9% 27,768,043,000 34.9%
School 
Districts  6,555,305,000 13.9% 11,433,564,000 25.8% 17,871,039,000 22.4%
Total $47,119,764,000 100.0% $59,376,169,000 100.0% $79,651,258,000 100.0%
Local  1992 % Local 1997 % Local 2002 
% 
Local 
County  $3,110,691,000 9.0% $4,033,643,000 6.8% $4,550,397,000 7.6%
  Municipal   5,625,073,000 16.2% 5,735,719,000 9.7% 8,042,435,000 13.5%
  Townships 481,328,000 1.4% 1,022,806,000 1.7% 1,430,651,000 2.4%
Special 
Districts and 
Authorities 18,898,573,000 54.5% 22,162,129,000 37.3% 27,768,043,000 46.5%
School 
Districts  6,555,305,000 18.9% 11,433,564,000 19.3% 17,871,039,000 30.0%
Total $34,670,970,000 100.0% $44,387,861,000 100.0% $59,662,565,000 100.0%
Tabulations of U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division database. 
 
deficiency or shortfall of proceeds to make the long-term plan be actuarially sound. In 
2004, the present value of liabilities was $5 billion greater than the present value of 
assets for the teacher retirement plan, and $1 billion greater for the other state plan.8 
If we add in the 2003 local unfunded accrued liabilities, then they total over $10 
billion, or about 13 percent of state long-term bonded indebtedness. Two years earlier 
the net financial position of the various plans was $2 billion net positive. (See Table 
10).  
                                                          
8 There is a several year reporting lag for both state funds in the recognition of the material decline 
in equity values that accompanied the 2001 stock market collapse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 10.  OTHER ACCRUED LONG-TERM LIABILITIES: PENNSYLVANIA STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS ($MILLIONS) 
-----------------------------------------Total Unfunded Accrued Liabilities ($1,000s)*------------------------------------------ 
 ------------State Pension Liabilities-------------- -----------Local Pension Liabilities---------- 
  
State 
Employee 
Retirement 
System 
Pennsylvania 
Employees 
Retirement 
System  State Total  County  Municipal  TOTAL Local 
State and 
Local 
Total 
1992 -280,974 -4,501,424 -4,782,398    -4,782,398
1993 -846,877 -3,303,187 -4,150,064    -4,150,064
1994 -249,429 -3,796,758 -4,046,187 105,714  105,714 -3,940,473
1995 -443,104 -3,101,518 -3,544,622 105,714 3,807,986 3,913,700 369,078
1996 -904,453 -1,458,937 -2,363,390 38,075 3,807,986 3,846,061 1,482,671
1997 -1,276,723 1,663,150 386,427 38,075 3,655,585 3,693,660 4,080,087
1998 -2,312,812 3,832,794 1,519,982 38,075 3,655,585 3,693,660 5,213,642
1999 -4,532,427 -7,107,477 -11,639,904 38,075 3,655,585 3,693,660 -7,946,244
2000 -6,392,028 -9,470,215 -15,862,243 9,330 3,655,585 3,664,915 -12,197,328
2001 -3,846,737 -6,913,006 -10,759,743 9,330 2,043,626 2,052,956 -8,706,787
2002 -1,847,075 -2,499,857 -4,346,932 58,548 2,043,626 2,102,174 -2,244,758
2003 -1,285,854 1,543,310 257,456 58,548 3,831,393 3,889,941 4,147,397
2004 1,099,000 5,028,521 6,127,521  58,548 3,831,393 3,889,941 10,017,462
*Note: positive entries are accrued net liabilities, negative entries are accrued net surpluses. Local liabilities for 2004 are 
repetitions of 2003 liabilities. 
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Each year the American Society of Civil Engineers estimates the value by 
state of deferred or delayed bridge maintenance. Their estimate for Pennsylvania in 
2005 was $2.3 billion in deferred road maintenance and $8 billion for deferred bridge 
maintenance for 725 bridges. To turn these cost estimates into financing requirements 
requires that the useful lives of the two sorts of capital undertakings be known, and 
that appropriate bond finance with reasonable interest rates be also assumed. Table 11 
indicates what the debt service requirements would be at 5 percent were the projects 
to begin in 2007. 
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TABLE 11.  ANNUAL DEBT SERVICE TO REFURBISH PENNSYLVANIA’S  
ROADS AND BRIDGES* 
 
Year 
Road 
Refurbishment 
Bridge 
Refurbishment Total 
2007 531,242,036 520,411,481 1,051,653,516 
2008 531,242,036 520,411,481 1,051,653,516 
2009 531,242,036 520,411,481 1,051,653,516 
2010 531,242,036 520,411,481 1,051,653,516 
2011 531,242,036 520,411,481 1,051,653,516 
2012  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2013  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2014  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2015  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2016  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2017  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2018  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2019  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2020  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2021  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2022  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2023  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2024  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2025  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2026  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2027  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2028  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2029  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2030  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2031  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2032  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2033  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2034  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2035  520,411,481 520,411,481 
2036  520,411,481 520,411,481 
*Assumes level payment for 5 and 30 years respectively to amortize 
$2.3 and $8.0 billion. 
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TABLE 12. PENNSYLVANIA STATE AND LOCAL TOTAL DEBT OUTSTANDING COMPARED TO 
REVENUE, EXPENDITURES AND REAL ESTATE TAX BASES 
  
Total 
State and 
Local 
Revenue 
Total 
State 
and 
Local 
Revenue 
from 
own 
sources 
Total 
State 
and 
Local 
General 
Revenue 
Total 
State 
and 
Local 
General 
Revenue 
Own 
Sources 
Total State 
and Local 
Expenditures 
Market 
Value of All 
Local 
Property** 
Assessed 
Value of All 
Local 
Property** 
1992* 76.6% 106.0% 89.0% 131.2% 78.0% NA NA
1993 75.2% 103.1% 90.7% 134.6% 80.2% NA NA
1994 78.0% 107.8% 93.1% 138.7% 80.8% NA NA
1995 71.3% 99.6% 83.7% 125.7% 72.7% NA NA
1996 73.0% 100.8% 88.0% 132.0% 78.0% 13.8% 48.2%
1997* 71.8% 97.8% 90.2% 135.3% 81.7% 16.6% 48.4%
1998 71.4% 98.5% 87.4% 131.9% 79.3% 14.8% 27.8%
1999 78.0% 108.8% 93.5% 141.2% 83.4% 16.4% 30.5%
2000 78.3% 107.4% 94.9% 141.3% 85.1% 16.6% 28.9%
2001 89.0% 132.7% 93.5% 143.0% 81.9% 16.6% 23.0%
2002* 93.5% 142.3% 95.2% 146.3% 81.6% 17.3% 24.8%
2003 91.6% 141.1% 96.4% 152.9% 82.5% 16.7% 22.9%
*Note: U.S. Census of Governments years. 
**Note: statewide totals of market and assessed values due to Pennsylvania State Tax Equalization 
Board. 
 
 
As noted earlier in Table 7, Pennsylvania through its constitution and the Unit 
Debt Act has limited local borrowing in relation to well-defined net revenues. Table 
12 performs some initial calculations by dividing total state and local long term debt, 
as measured by the Governments Division by various measures of government 
revenues, expenditures,9 and real estate tax bases. No distinction is made between 
non-electoral debt by the Governments Division, and the indicated ratios in relation 
to revenues are well within the 225 percent to 300 percent local Unit Debt Act limits. 
On the other hand, had Pennsylvania continued to restrict borrowing in relation to 
measures of the real estate tax base, then it is obvious that limitations would have 
been reached.  
Table 13 performs the same ratio analysis but just for total local long-term 
debt  in  relation to total local budgetary and real estate tax base measures. Since long  
                                                          
9 The various budgetary measures are due to the Governments Division. 
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TABLE 13.  PENNSYLVANIA’S TOTAL LOCAL DEBT  COMPARED TO VARIOUS LOCAL BUDGET AND 
TAX BASE MEASURES 
  
Total  
Local 
Revenue 
Total 
Local 
Revenue 
from 
own 
sources 
Total 
State 
Local 
General 
Revenue 
Total  
Local 
General 
Revenue 
Own 
Sources 
Total Local 
Expenditures 
Market 
Value of All 
Local 
Property** 
Assessed 
Value of 
All Local 
Property** 
1992* 134.9% 210.6% 145.4% 237.3% 130.9%     
1993 146.1% 231.3% 163.5% 278.2% 147.7%     
1994 150.9% 241.4% 165.6% 281.3% 149.0%     
1995 133.8% 217.4% 145.1% 248.7% 135.3%     
1996 138.8% 225.6% 152.6% 264.6% 140.0% 9.6% 33.4% 
1997* 130.7% 208.9% 142.7% 241.1% 130.9% 12.3% 36.0% 
1998 130.0% 215.4% 143.5% 255.1% 131.0% 10.5% 19.7% 
1999 143.0% 237.3% 157.0% 278.4% 143.2% 11.8% 22.1% 
2000 148.3% 244.5% 161.1% 281.3% 149.7% 12.1% 21.1% 
2001 152.0% 254.5% 162.4% 285.0% 146.2% 12.1% 16.8% 
2002* 148.6% 245.7% 156.2% 267.1% 136.4% 12.8% 18.4% 
2003 146.9% 256.5% 154.4% 280.4% 141.0% 11.6% 15.9% 
*Note: U.S. Census of Governments years. 
**Note: statewide totals of market and assessed values due to Pennsylvania State Tax Equalization 
Board. 
 
term debt of local governments and authorities are included, this more focused 
analysis should be compared to the limitations that range from 200 percent for 
Philadelphia to 400 percent for counties. The ratio analysis shows that when total 
debt of local governments is compared to total own source revenues, which would 
include some items that properly should be subtracted, aggregate debt limits appear to 
be getting much closer to being triggered. Further, if assessed value were still the debt 
limit base, at 10 or 13 percent, it is clear that statewide local indebtedness would have 
been severely limited. 
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C. Some Troubled Pennsylvania Local Governments 
 
Our review of the indebtedness of Pennsylvania’s local governments leads us 
to examine more closely municipalities which in conjunction with their overlapping 
school districts and public authorities have high per-capita long-term debt, and whose 
debt has been growing rapidly. (See Table 14).  In some instances, total overlapping 
debt has been relatively constant in per-capita terms; Allentown’s per-capita debt was 
$1,930 in 1992 and $1,970. In 2002. Bethlehem, near Allentown, increased its 
overlapping debt per-capita by factor of 5 from $1,044 in 1992 to $5,187 in 2002. 
Erie’s overlapping debt per-capita rose from $741 to $3,592. Among the 
municipalities reviewed in detail, Harrisburg, the state capitol, had the highest over-
lapping debt per-capita: it was $16,153 in 1992, and $14, 456 in 2002.  Philadelphia’s 
overlapping debt per-capita rose from $4,667 in 1992 to $7,923 in 2002 while 
Pittsburgh’s overlapping debt jumped from $3,282 in 1992 to $6,095 in 2002. 
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TABLE 14.  MAJOR PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR OVERLAPPING LONG-TERM 
DEBT SUM OF MUNICIPAL, SCHOOL AND  AUTHORITIES DEBT 
Municipality Year Population 
Full Faith and 
Credit 
Non-
Guaranteed 
Debt 
Total Debt 
Per Capita 
1992 105,090 $34,285,000 $168,521,000 $1,930
1997 102,211 $121,053,000 $156,739,000 $2,718
Allentown 2002 106,632 $122,663,000 $87,443,000 $1,970
1992 51,881 $15,865,000 $24,773,000 $783
Altoona 1997 50,101 $49,494,000 $76,313,000 $2,511
1992 71,428 $57,155,000 $17,392,000 $1,044
1997 70,245 $274,751,000 $126,785,000 $5,716
Bethlehem 2002 71,329 $211,994,000 $157,972,000 $5,187
1992 10,664 $255,000 $0 $24
Carbondale 1997 9,953 $8,095,000 $40,000 $817
1992 11,038 $45,685,000 $30,082,000 $6,864
1997 10,827 $101,123,000 $19,945,000 $11,182
Coatesville 2002 10,838 $104,183,000 $0 $9,613
1992 108,718 $42,735,000 $37,859,000 $741
1997 105,270 $115,761,000 $138,423,000 $2,415
Erie 2002 103,717 $222,839,000 $149,586,000 $3,591
1992 52,376 $60,387,000 $785,639,000 $16,153
1997 50,886 $193,086,000 $224,437,000 $8,205
Harrisburg 2002 48,950 $277,391,000 $430,212,000 $14,456
1992 28,134 $2,760,000 $8,844,000 $412
1997 26,149 $15,296,000 $30,086,000 $1,736
Johnstown 2002 23,906 $7,557,000 $0 $316
1992 55,551 $8,250,000 $87,603,000 $1,725
1997 53,597 $23,831,000 $108,250,000 $2,464
Lancaster 2002 56,348 $158,412,000 $0 $2,811
1992 24,800 $1,470,000 $13,550,000 $606
Lebanon 1997 23,791 $1,490,000 $18,395,000 $836
1992 26,016 $2,720,000 $19,920,000 $870
1997 23,343 $60,656,000 $24,023,000 $3,628
McKeesport 2002 24,040 $109,448,000 $6,743,000 $4,833
1992 28,334 $20,038,000 $32,289,000 $1,847
New Castle 1997 26,845 $12,822,000 $35,671,000 $1,806
1992 15,894 $2,060,000 $0 $130
1997 15,233 $4,522,000 $12,933,000 $1,146
New Kensington 2002 14,701 $820,000 $28,000 $58
1992 1,585,577 $2,045,418,000 $5,353,800,000 $4,667
1997 1,478,002 $1,615,830,000 $5,643,852,000 $4,912
Philadelphia 2002 1,517,550 $2,840,666,000 $9,183,245,000 $7,923
Table 14 continues next page…
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TABLE 14 (CONTINUED).  MAJOR PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR OVERLAPPING 
LONG-TERM DEBT SUM OF MUNICIPAL, SCHOOL AND  AUTHORITIES DEBT 
Municipality Year Population 
Full Faith and 
Credit 
Non-
Guaranteed 
Debt 
Total Debt 
Per Capita 
1992 369,879 $566,643,000 $647,142,000 $3,282
1997 350,363 $782,290,000 $782,714,000 $4,467
Pittsburgh 2002 334,563 $1,209,391,000 $829,628,000 $6,095
1992 78,380 $126,341,000 $54,301,000 $2,305
1997 75,723 $136,280,000 $83,654,000 $2,904
Reading 2002 81,207 $256,133,000 $66,615,000 $3,974
1992 81,805 $18,737,000 $34,069,000 $646
1997 77,189 $23,896,000 $32,878,000 $736
Scranton 2002 76,415 $104,633,000 $8,265,000 $1,477
1992 17,493 $4,281,000 $32,852,000 $2,123
1997 16,766 $11,478,000 $31,363,000 $2,555
Sharon 2002 16,328 $40,261,000 $33,955,000 $4,545
1992 47,523 $12,790,000 $26,750,000 $832
Wilkes-Barre 1997 44,407 $30,511,000 $13,309,000 $987
1992 42,192 $39,169,000 $59,911,000 $2,348
York 1997 40,779 $71,961,000 $37,508,000 $2,684
 
 
D. Philadelphia and Pittsburgh in More Detail 
 
In 1991 the short-term bond market refused to lend further to the City of 
Philadelphia which in turn precipitated a financial crisis. The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly passed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act that applied just to 
Philadelphia, and an oversight board installed with the responsibility to oversee the 
City (but not the School District or related public authorities) Budget. In 2004, debt 
service for Pittsburgh was projected to be 23 percent of operating expenses; this 
figure is better than twice that recommended by the Municipal Finance Officers of 
American, and higher than New York City experienced during its “debt service 
moratorium” in the 1970s. 
 
D.1. Philadelphia 
 
Table 15 displays the components to the City of Philadelphia, and the long-
term debt outstanding as collected and reported by the Governments Division of the 
Census  Bureau.  We  have   included   in   these   calculations   indebtedness   of   the  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 15.  PHILADELPHIA’S OVERLAPPING DEBT ($MILLIONS) 
 
City 
Government 
($Millions) 
Parking 
Authority 
($Millions) 
Other 
Authorities 
($Millions) 
Hospital 
Authority 
($Millions) 
Economic 
Development 
($Millions) 
School 
District 
($Millions) 
Total 
($Millions) 
Per-
Capita 
Debt 
1992 $3,739 $103 $224 $1,106 $1,222 $860 $7,254 $4,575
1993 $3,781 $101 $224 $1,517 $1,129 $832 $7,584 $4,783
1994 $3,673 $99 $431 $1,528 $1,055 $967 $7,753 $5,087
1995 $3,590 $96 $0 $1,420 $961 $721 $6,788 $4,453
1996 $3,515 $93 $434 $1,494 $867 $860 $7,264 $4,915
1997 $3,423 $96 $224 $1,522 $857 $937 $7,059 $4,776
1998 $3,961 $94 $411 $1,445 $915 $943 $7,769 $5,256
1999 $4,783 $144 $385 $1,516 $1,397 $1,058 $9,283 $6,463
2000 $4,435 $354 $362 $1,487 $2,700 $1,152 $10,489 $6,912
2001 $4,673 $424 $335 $1,466 $2,834 $1,293 $11,024 $7,264
2002 $5,158 $424* $19 $1,473 $3,284 $2,030 $12,386 $8,162
2003 $5,469 $424* $19* $1,857 $3,302 $2,108 $13,179 $8,831
*Estimate based on prior year. 
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Philadelphia Hospital Authority but not the Philadelphia Airport. We estimate that 
the total overlapping long term debt outstanding for Philadelphia in 2003 was $13.2 
billion, or $8,831 in per-capita terms. Note that it has steadily increased even though 
it has been in receivership, and that it has been rising most quickly in the areas of 
Economic Development and in the Philadelphia public schools. 
 
D.2. Pittsburgh 
 
The indebtedness situation in Pittsburgh is complicated by a complex public 
authority structure10 as well as the responsibility that Pittsburgh residents have for 
various county indebtedness in support of two professional sports stadiums through 
the joint City-County Sports and Exhibition Authority, and the Allegheny County 
Airport whose debt is now the responsibility of the Airport Authority. Allegheny 
County also has a hospital authority with several billions of outstanding long-term 
indebtedness, as well as a new convention center that is currently losing $20 
million/year. If one adds up outstanding City long-term debt, its unfunded pension 
liabilities, the debt of the Pittsburgh Public schools, and the city’s proportionate share 
of county debt, long-term debt per-capita can reach $12,000 in 2004. 
While most attention has been focused on Pittsburgh’s near bankruptcy, the 
financial position of the Pittsburgh Public Schools has deteriorated materially in 
2006, and is expected to worsen in 2007 when it will be facing a $20 million deficit. 
 
                                                          
10 Pittsburgh has an:  Parking Authority, Urban Redevelopment Authority,  Water and Sewer 
Authority, a Stadium Authority (for 3 Rivers Stadium), a Housing Authority, a joint Sports and 
Exhibition Authority, and an Equipment Leasing Authority. Allegheny County has an Airport 
Authority, and a Hospital Authority.  
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V.  Pennsylvania’s Foreseeable Financial Future 
 
We now turn to examine what the future holds for Pennsylvania’s public 
sector. Given commitments made in the past, what will debt service burdens look like 
over the next quarter century? What will the implied tax rates be needed to pay off 
this debt? 
 
A. General Considerations and Assumptions 
 
Unfortunately, no long-run growth model of the Pennsylvania economy is 
available to develop measures of either income or real estate tax base. The median 
growth rate over the past decade was 3.8 percent, and is used as a first approximation 
of what will be available to ultimately pay for debt service. Since we do not readily 
know how much of the debt we open our analysis with in 2004 is self-liquidating, the 
following calculations must be viewed as very preliminary. The second strong 
assumption we make at the outset of this analysis, which will be revised upon further 
analysis, is that the total state and local  long-term debt of $79 billion outstanding is 
what  needs to be amortized. Sinking funds exist that make this figure considerably 
smaller; however, in the interests of performing a first analysis, we shall presume that 
the $79 billion needs to be amortized on a level basis for 25 years at 5 percent.  
The actuaries of the two state pension plans report contribution schedules 
going out beyond 25 years, and we shall use their analysis in arriving at the annual 
pattern of total debt service. Unfortunately, the municipal plans do not report in the 
aggregate a similar contribution schedule, and we shall assume that the unfunded 
liability is amortized on a level basis over 25 years at 5 percent. It should be noted 
that the two state pension funds are quite optimistic in assuming a 8.5 percent annual 
rate of return. 
 
B. Results: Paying for the Next 25 Years 
 
Our first calculations of debt service requirements for Pennsylvania’s state 
and local sector are contained in Table 16. Paying off the opening debt of $79 billion 
over 25 years requires about $6 billion/year in interest and principal, while the 
actuarial  projections  for  the two large state pension plans (PSERS and SERS) begin 
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TABLE 16.  DEBT SERVICE PROJECTIONS ($ MILLIONS)  
Year 
Amortization 
Of State and 
Local Debt 
PSERS and 
SERS - 
actuarial 
projections 
Pension - 
Municipal and 
County 
Amortization 
Total State and 
Local  Debt Service 
Ratio of Debt 
Service to 
Personal 
Income 
2005 6,072.7 855.0 295.5 7,223.2 1.7%
2006 6,072.7 1,394.0 295.5 7,762.2 1.7%
2007 6,072.7 1,711.0 295.5 8,079.2 1.8%
2008 6,072.7 1,881.0 295.5 8,249.2 1.8%
2009 6,072.7 1,969.0 295.5 8,337.2 1.7%
2010 6,072.7 2,036.0 295.5 8,404.2 1.7%
2011 6,072.7 3,093.0 295.5 9,461.2 1.6%
2012 6,072.7 5,378.0 295.5 11,746.2 1.8%
2013 6,072.7 5,286.0 295.5 11,654.2 2.1%
2014 6,072.7 5,196.0 295.5 11,564.2 2.0%
2015 6,072.7 5,249.0 295.5 11,617.2 1.9%
2016 6,072.7 5,306.0 295.5 11,674.2 1.9%
2017 6,072.7 5,370.0 295.5 11,738.2 1.8%
2018 6,072.7 5,433.0 295.5 11,801.2 1.8%
2019 6,072.7 5,506.0 295.5 11,874.2 1.7%
2020 6,072.7 5,583.0 295.5 11,951.2 1.7%
2021 6,072.7 5,662.0 295.5 12,030.2 1.6%
2022 6,072.7 5,744.0 295.5 12,112.2 1.6%
2023 6,072.7 5,830.0 295.5 12,198.2 1.5%
2024 6,072.7 5,922.0 295.5 12,290.2 1.5%
2025 6,072.7 6,016.0 295.5 12,384.2 1.4%
2026 6,072.7 6,114.0 295.5 12,482.2 1.4%
2027 6,072.7 6,217.0 295.5 12,585.2 1.3%
2028 6,072.7 6,324.0 295.5 12,692.2 1.3%
2029 6,072.7 6,429.0 295.5 12,797.2 1.2%
2030 6,072.7 6,544.0 295.5 12,912.2 1.2%
 
 
modestly at $0.855 in 2005 and then grow rapidly. By 2010 the pension plans require 
$2 billion/year, and by 2012 (6 years from now), require $5.4 billion/year, or almost 
as much annual funding as that needed to pay off the bonded indebtedness. 
The implied tax rate on BEA personal income ranges from 1.7 percent in 
2006 to 1.8 percent in the following 2 years. In 2013, largely because of anticipated 
increases in pension contributions, the implied tax rate jumps to 2.1 percent and then 
declines to 2.0 percent in 2014. Of course, less optimistic assumptions about 
economic growth could easily increase this implied tax rate. Currently, 
Pennsylvania’s state income tax rate is 3.08 percent, and most municipalities and 
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school districts levy a 1 percent combined local earned income tax rate. Thus, the 
implied tax rate in Table 16 is not small. 
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VI. Summary and Future Research 
 
The purpose of this report has been to measure the long-term financial 
position of Pennsylvania’s state and local public sector, and to make projections. At 
the conceptual level, these long-term obligations or liabilities are composed of 
bonded indebtedness of state government, local governments and their 
instrumentalities. To these must be added other liabilities which are of the same 
character: pension and health care commitments that reflect collective bargaining 
decisions and the defined benefit plans that characterize state and local government, 
deferred maintenance of the capital stock, and constitutional promises about 
maintenance of human capital (education), and statutory promises about maintaining 
the physical environment.  
As a practical matter, measuring all these promises, both historically and 
projecting into the future is beyond the scope of one report. In Pennsylvania, 
measurement is complicated by the plethora of local governments, and the practice of 
relying on public authorities for about ½ of local long-term capital commitments. 
This not only impedes scholarly measurement, but also public transparency.  
Historically, Pennsylvania has limited state exposure to the risks of local 
indebtedness except to defray the costs of putting down local insurrections. 
Otherwise, local governments are on their own. That said, over the past decade, state 
long-term debt, including that of various state authorities as been about 25 percent of 
total state and local long-term debt that is measured by the Governments Division of 
the Census Bureau. 
Local long-term debt has been a rather high percentage of locally assessed 
real estate, ranging from 36 percent in 1997 to 18.4 percent in 2003. When compared 
to equalized market value, local long term debt has ranged from 12.3 percent in 1997 
to 12.8 percent in 2003. Had earlier debt limits based on the assessed value of the real 
estate tax base been put in place, which ranged from 10 to 13 percent, it is clear that 
such levels of indebtedness would not be sustainable.  
Investigation of overlapping per-capita long-term indebtedness of 
municipalities in Pennsylvania indicates that there is widespread variation. 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, both under receivership have per-capita overlapping debt 
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of respectively $8,831 and $12,000. Harrisburg’s overlapping per-capita debt has 
been as high as $16,000, and that does not include calculations for the accrued net 
liabilities of its local pension plans. 
In 2005, total state and local debt service, including amortization of unfunded 
pension liabilities, was 1.7 percent of BEA personal income, and is projected to 
remain at that level of implied tax rate for several years. By 2013, however, it jumps 
to 2.1 percent, a 23 percent increase, largely because of the adverse position of the 
two largest state pension plans. Taxpayers will largely be surprised by this necessary 
adjustment in contributions, and likely there will be active political discussion of the 
sort of local taxes (real estate and or income) that will be increased. 
The analysis reported should be viewed as preliminary but indicative, and 
much work remains to refine the indebtedness calculations, taking into account extant 
sinking fund assets, and the fees routinely used to amortize existing debt. Since the 
quality of our life depends on the condition of our public infrastructure and the 
efficacy of ongoing commitments to human capital and the environment, further 
effort is required to measure these resource needs. 
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Appendix 1.  List of Pennsylvania Authorities 
 
Three Largest Authorities: 
Higher Educational Facilities Authority 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission 
State Public School Building Authority 
 
Automobile Theft Prevention Authority 
Ben Franklin Technology Development Authority 
Commonwealth Mental Health Research Foundation 
Delaware River Bridge and Tunnel Commission 
Delaware River Joint Bridge Commission of Pennsylvania and New York 
Department of transportation districts 
Flood control districts 
Health districts 
Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority 
Parking authorities in first-class cities 
Patient Safety Authority 
Pennsylvania Civil Disorder Authority 
Pennsylvania Economic Development Financing Authority 
Pennsylvania Energy Development Authority 
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority 
Pennsylvania Minority Business Development Authority 
Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency 
Pennsylvania Parent Assistance Authority 
Pennsylvania Public Television Network Commission 
Pocono Mountain Memorial Parkway Commission 
Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board 
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Appendix 2.  Per-Capita Debt of County Governments – Primary 
Government 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt per 
Capita 
1992 1,336,449 $651,434,000 $626,547,000 $956
1997 1,296,037 $611,515,000 $818,060,000 $1,103
Allegheny  2002 1,281,666 $602,219,000 $772,940,000 $1,073
1992 73,478 $3,090,000 $0 $42
1997 73,872 $11,010,000 $0 $149
Armstrong  2002 72,392 $0 $0   
1992 186,093 $17,868,000 $0 $96
1997 187,009 $80,081,000 $0 $428
Beaver  2002 181,412 $80,180,000 $0 $442
1992 336,523 $130,749,000 $0 $389
1997 352,353 $195,503,000 $0 $555
Berks  2002 373,638 $225,147,000 $0 $603
1992 130,542 $7,500,000 $0 $57
1997 131,450 $5,403,000 $0 $41
Blair  2002 129,144 $18,300,000 $0 $142
1992 60,967 $8,860,000 $0 $145
1997 62,352 $0 $6,920,000 $111
Bradford  2002 62,761 $0 $4,870,000 $78
1992 541,174 $118,588,000 $3,975,000 $226
1997 578,715 $105,840,000 $0 $183
Bucks  2002 597,635 $120,960,000 $0 $202
1992 152,013 $23,160,000 $0 $152
1997 167,732 $25,237,000 $0 $150
Butler  2002 174,083 $20,898,000 $0 $120
1992 163,029 $13,090,000 $0 $80
1997 158,500 $41,107,000 $0 $259
Cambria  2002 152,598 $55,017,000 $0 $361
1992 56,846 $0 $0   
1997 58,783 $17,340,000 $0 $295
Carbon  2002 58,802 $16,540,000 $0 $281
1992 123,786 $0 $4,450,000 $36
Centre  1997 131,489 $27,390,000 $0 $208
1992 376,396 $49,870,000 $0 $132
1997 410,744 $133,618,000 $0 $325
Chester  2002 433,501 $201,998,000 $0 $466
1992 78,097 $1,415,000 $0 $18
1997 79,640 $3,018,000 $0 $38
Clearfield  2002 83,382 $1,228,000 $0 $15
Appendix 2 continues next page…
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Appendix 2 (continued).  Per-Capita Debt of County Governments – 
Primary Government 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt per 
Capita 
1992 86,169 $0 $5,940,000 $69
1997 89,175 $13,929,000 $0 $156
Crawford  2002 90,366 $11,468,000 $0 $127
1992 195,257 $14,390,000 $0 $74
1997 207,042 $24,201,000 $0 $117
Cumberland  2002 213,674 $35,615,000 $0 $167
1992 237,813 $48,790,000 $0 $205
1997 246,807 $54,936,000 $0 $223
Dauphin  2002 251,798 $107,682,000 $0 $428
1992 547,651 $135,548,000 $0 $248
1997 547,592 $234,561,000 $0 $428
Delaware  2002 550,864 $325,270,000 $0 $590
1992 275,572 $38,840,000 $0 $141
1997 280,570 $37,820,000 $0 $135
Erie  2002 280,843 $0 $32,064,000 $114
1992 145,351 $0 $0   
1997 145,628 $0 $0   
Fayette  2002 148,644 $11,715,000 $0 $79
1992 121,082 $0 $0   
1997 127,035 $4,760,000 $0 $37
Franklin  2002 129,313 $5,180,000 $0 $40
1992 44,164 $415,000 $0 $9
Huntingdon  1997 44,977 $130,000 $0 $3
1992 219,039 $29,199,000 $0 $133
1997 213,323 $52,955,000 $0 $248
Lackawanna  2002 213,295 $105,451,000 $0 $494
1992 422,822 $41,290,000 $0 $98
1997 450,834 $53,878,000 $0 $120
Lancaster  2002 470,658 $0 $122,326,000 $260
1992 96,246 $4,835,000 $0 $50
Lawrence  1997 95,780 $14,940,000 $0 $156
1992 113,744 $0 $6,341,000 $56
1997 117,179 $5,257,000 $0 $45
Lebanon  2002 120,327 $10,852,000 $0 $90
1992 291,130 $76,635,000 $0 $263
1997 297,802 $139,956,000 $0 $470
Lehigh  2002 312,090 $133,666,000 $0 $428
1992 328,149 $23,845,000 $0 $73
1997 321,309 $70,628,000 $0 $220
Luzerne  2002 319,250 $75,415,000 $11,140,000 $271
Appendix 2 continues next page…
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Appendix 2 (continued).  Per-Capita Debt of County Governments – 
Primary Government 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt per 
Capita 
1992 118,710 $18,180,000 $0 $153
1997 119,083 $17,110,000 $0 $144
Lycoming  2002 120,044 $0 $34,705,000 $289
1992 47,131 $1,959,000 $0 $42
McKean  1997 48,156 $2,103,000 $0 $44
1992 121,003 $0 $2,547,000 $21
1997 122,155 $6,062,000 $0 $50
Mercer  2002 120,293 $34,524,000 $0 $287
1992 678,111 $70,985,000 $690,546,000 $1,123
1997 708,782 $141,788,000 $638,350,000 $1,101
Montgomery  2002 750,097 $213,858,000 $497,734,000 $949
1992 247,105 $10,895,000 $0 $44
1997 257,719 $22,754,000 $0 $88
Northampton  2002 267,066 $140,500,000 $0 $526
1992 96,771 $0 $0   
1997 95,897 $8,580,000 $0 $89
Northumberland  2002 94,556 $27,410,000 $0 $290
1992 152,585 $16,590,000 $0 $109
1997 152,630 $20,119,000 $0 $132
Schuylkill  2002 150,336 $29,430,000 $0 $196
1992 40,380 $4,250,000 $0 $105
1997 42,002 $7,085,000 $0 $169
Susquehanna  2002 42,238 $0 $6,065,000 $144
1992 36,176 $0 $0   
1997 40,826 $0 $0   
Union  2002 41,624 $0 $0   
1992 59,381 $4,995,000 $0 $84
1997 58,820 $15,275,000 $0 $260
Venango  2002 57,565 $13,148,000 $0 $228
1992 204,584 $10,343,000 $0 $51
1997 206,708 $6,571,000 $0 $32
Washington  2002 202,897 $13,035,000 $0 $64
1992 370,321 $73,052,000 $0 $197
1997 376,297 $153,465,000 $0 $408
Westmoreland  2002 369,993 $170,340,000 $0 $460
1992 339,574 $34,150,000 $0 $101
1997 368,332 $31,335,000 $0 $85
York  2002 381,751 $95,870,000 $0 $251
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Appendix 3.  Overlapping Per-Capita Debt – County Government, Authorities, 
Education 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt Per 
Capita 
1992  1,336,449 $651,434,000 $2,377,118,000 $2,266
1997  1,296,037 $651,291,000 $2,506,371,000 $2,436
 
 
Allegheny  2002  1,281,666 $602,725,000 $5,652,419,000 $4,880
1992     73,478 $3,090,000 $29,969,000 $450
1997     73,872 $11,010,000 $17,590,000 $387
 
 
Armstrong  2002     72,392 $0 $65,862,000 $910
1992   186,093 $17,868,000 $590,019,000 $3,267
1997   187,009 $80,081,000 $212,861,000 $1,566
 
 
Beaver  2002   181,412 $80,180,000 $494,556,000 $3,168
1992   336,523 $130,749,000 $544,815,000 $2,007
1997   352,353 $195,503,000 $373,919,000 $1,616
 
 
Berks  2002   373,638 $240,606,000 $496,938,000 $1,974
1992   130,542 $7,500,000 $88,767,000 $737
1997   131,450 $5,462,000 $70,110,000 $575
 
 
Blair  2002   129,144 $18,777,000 $41,163,000 $464
1992     60,967 $8,860,000 $15,432,000 $398
1997     62,352 $0 $21,427,000 $344
 
 
Bradford  2002     62,761 $0 $46,394,000 $739
1992   541,174 $118,588,000 $222,780,000 $631
1997   578,715 $106,869,000 $316,226,000 $731
 
 
Bucks  2002   597,635 $123,489,000 $317,234,000 $737
1992   152,013 $23,440,000 $126,408,000 $986
1997   167,732 $25,442,000 $277,644,000 $1,807
 
 
Butler  2002   174,083 $20,898,000 $262,942,000 $1,630
1992   163,029 $13,090,000 $195,150,000 $1,277
1997   158,500 $41,107,000 $541,424,000 $3,675
 
 
Cambria  2002   152,598 $55,017,000 $241,457,000 $1,943
1992     56,846 $161,000 $17,043,000 $303
1997     58,783 $20,161,000 $918,000 $359
 
 
Carbon  2002     58,802 $26,540,000 $23,363,000 $849
1992   123,786 $0 $13,853,000 $112 
Centre  1997   131,489 $29,893,000 $16,041,000 $349
1992   376,396 $49,870,000 $620,245,000 $1,780
1997   410,744 $133,631,000 $406,616,000 $1,315
 
 
Chester  2002   433,501 $213,799,000 $382,770,000 $1,376
1992     78,097 $1,415,000 $940,000 $30
1997     79,640 $3,018,000 $0 $38
 
 
Clearfield  2002     83,382 $1,228,000 $0 $15
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Appendix 3 (continued).  Overlapping Per-Capita Debt – County Government, 
Authorities, Education 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt Per 
Capita 
1992     86,169 $0 $16,552,000 $192
1997     89,175 $14,242,000 $0 $160
 
 
Crawford  2002     90,366 $11,468,000 $0 $127
1992   195,257 $14,390,000 $74,560,000 $456
1997   207,042 $24,201,000 $39,886,000 $310
 
 
Cumberland  2002   213,674 $35,785,000 $22,864,000 $274
1992   237,813 $48,790,000 $481,163,000 $2,228
1997   246,807 $57,572,000 $347,285,000 $1,640
 
 
Dauphin  2002   251,798 $107,682,000 $867,191,000 $3,872
1992   547,651 $135,548,000 $1,058,698,000 $2,181
1997   547,592 $234,561,000 $1,335,486,000 $2,867
 
 
Delaware  2002   550,864 $325,270,000 $1,486,813,000 $3,290
1992   275,572 $38,840,000 $233,541,000 $988
1997   280,570 $38,194,000 $205,062,000 $867
 
 
Erie  2002   280,843 $0 $303,100,000 $1,079
1992   145,351 $0 $2,110,000 $15
1997   145,628 $0 $2,819,000 $19
 
 
Fayette  2002   148,644 $11,715,000 $0 $79
1992   121,082 $0 $35,231,000 $291
1997   127,035 $4,760,000 $44,733,000 $390
 
 
Franklin  2002   129,313 $5,180,000 $29,203,000 $266
1992     44,164 $4,498,000 $0 $102 
Huntingdon  1997     44,977 $875,000 $2,670,000 $79
1992   219,039 $29,199,000 $25,006,000 $247
1997   213,323 $67,425,000 $8,666,000 $357
 
 
Lackawanna  2002   213,295 $114,832,000 $0 $538
1992   422,822 $41,290,000 $371,006,000 $975
1997   450,834 $53,878,000 $389,452,000 $983
 
 
Lancaster  2002   470,658 $0 $664,551,000 $1,412
1992     96,246 $4,835,000 $34,357,000 $407 
Lawrence  1997     95,780 $14,940,000 $10,594,000 $267
1992   113,744 $0 $54,539,000 $479
1997   117,179 $5,257,000 $75,405,000 $688
 
 
Lebanon  2002   120,327 $10,852,000 $99,774,000 $919
1992   291,130 $82,690,000 $552,418,000 $2,182
1997   297,802 $139,956,000 $606,529,000 $2,507
 
 
Lehigh  2002   312,090 $135,006,000 $592,631,000 $2,331
1992   328,149 $23,845,000 $32,855,000 $173
1997   321,309 $94,733,000 $52,959,000 $460
 
 
Luzerne  2002   319,250 $75,415,000 $30,097,000 $330
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Appendix 3 (continued).  Overlapping Per-Capita Debt – County Government, 
Authorities, Education 
Name Year Population FFC NG 
Debt Per 
Capita 
1992   118,710 $18,517,000 $139,322,000 $1,330
1997   119,083 $17,110,000 $167,243,000 $1,548
 
 
Lycoming  2002   120,044 $0 $243,977,000 $2,032
1992     47,131 $1,959,000 $22,713,000 $523 
McKean  1997     48,156 $3,906,000 $37,497,000 $860
1992   121,003 $0 $14,443,000 $119
1997   122,155 $6,062,000 $7,076,000 $108
 
 
Mercer  2002   120,293 $34,586,000 $0 $288
1992   678,111 $70,985,000 $1,165,315,000 $1,823
1997   708,782 $141,788,000 $1,326,534,000 $2,072
 
 
Montgomery  2002   750,097 $221,673,000 $1,133,772,000 $1,807
1992   247,105 $10,895,000 $175,680,000 $755
1997   257,719 $22,754,000 $379,262,000 $1,560
 
 
Northampton  2002   267,066 $140,500,000 $340,700,000 $1,802
1992     96,771 $0 $77,886,000 $805
1997     95,897 $8,580,000 $76,383,000 $886
 
 
Northumberland  2002     94,556 $27,410,000 $0 $290
1992   152,585 $16,590,000 $44,020,000 $397
1997   152,630 $20,119,000 $90,582,000 $725
 
 
Schuylkill  2002   150,336 $29,430,000 $4,015,000 $222
1992     40,380 $4,250,000 $5,063,000 $231
1997     42,002 $7,085,000 $4,402,000 $273
 
 
Susquehanna  2002     42,238 $0 $6,065,000 $144
1992     36,176 $0 $44,125,000 $1,220
1997     40,826 $0 $67,055,000 $1,642
 
 
Union  2002     41,624 $0 $49,015,000 $1,178
1992     59,381 $4,995,000 $0 $84
1997     58,820 $15,275,000 $0 $260
 
 
Venango  2002     57,565 $13,148,000 $0 $228
1992   204,584 $10,343,000 $72,599,000 $405
1997   206,708 $6,571,000 $231,135,000 $1,150
 
 
Washington  2002   202,897 $13,035,000 $229,025,000 $1,193
1992   370,321 $73,052,000 $337,267,000 $1,108
1997   376,297 $187,670,000 $327,223,000 $1,368
 
 
Westmoreland  2002   369,993 $170,434,000 $324,426,000 $1,337
1992   339,574 $34,150,000 $230,831,000 $780
1997   368,332 $31,335,000 $391,935,000 $1,149
 
 
York  2002   381,751 $182,055,000 $281,264,000 $1,214
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Appendix 4.  Accrued Liabilities of County Pensions – FY 2002 
County 
Unfunded 
Liabilities County 
Unfunded 
Liabilities 
Adams -$6,472,265 Lackawanna $0
Allegheny $54,399,109 Lancaster $1,019,662
Armstrong -$3,005,787 Lawrence -$4,257,305
Beaver -$2,631,081 Lebanon -$13,378,057
Bedford $0 Lehigh -$29,500,665
Berks $0 Luzerne $0
Blair $0 Lycoming -$11,182,727
Bradford $0 McKean $0
Bucks $0 Mercer -$4,105,594
Butler $0 Mifflin $211,041
Cambria -$7,874,922 Monroe $0
Cameron $0 Montgomery -$101,994,918
Carbon -$10,179,110 Montour -$167,387
Centre $0 Northampton -$11,011,145
Chester $0 Northumberland -$13,848,049
Clarion -$3,367,616 Perry $0
Clearfield -$3,925,021 Pike $1,530,903
Clinton $0 Potter $0
Columbia $0 Schuylkill -$4,188,148
Crawford -$3,241,238 Snyder -$282,508
Cumberland $0 Somerset $0
Dauphin $0 Sullivan $0
Delaware -$44,692,398 Susquehanna $0
Elk -$1,187,486 Tioga $0
Erie -$9,385,558 Union -$1,740,669
Fayette -$22,164,035 Venango -$16,514,544
Forest $1,424 Warren -$1,457,228
Franklin -$1,361,933 Washington -$3,169,768
Fulton -$59,306 Wayne $0
Greene $0 Westmoreland -$4,202,334
Huntingdon -$579,921 Wyoming $0
Indiana $0 York $0
Jefferson -$3,691,532 TOTAL -$287,658,116
Juniata $0  
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Appendix 5.  Municipal Debt Per Capita 
Name Year 4 Population FFC NG 
Debt 
Per 
Capita 
1992 105,090 $0 $82,039,000 $781
1997 102,211 $86,695,000 $77,367,000 $1,605
 
 
Allentown  2002 106,632 $84,000,000 $75,794,000 $1,499
1992 51,881 $1,301,000 $1,235,000 $49 
Altoona  1997 50,101 $2,164,000 $0 $43
1992 71,428 $21,790,000 $0 $305
1997 70,245 $59,482,000 $91,120,000 $2,144
 
 
Bethlehem  2002 71,329 $26,868,000 $147,309,000 $2,442
1992 10,664 $255,000 $0 $24 
Carbondale  1997 9,953 $1,990,000 $0 $200
1992 11,038 $5,180,000 $0 $469
1997 10,827 $4,948,000 $0 $457
 
 
Coatesville  2002 10,838 $7,959,000 $0 $734
1992 108,718 $8,860,000 $0 $81
1997 105,270 $29,525,000 $0 $280
 
 
Erie  2002 103,717 $94,705,000 $0 $913
1992 52,376 $50,671,000 $464,310,000 $9,832
1997 50,886 $71,882,000 $810,000 $1,429
 
 
Harrisburg  2002 48,950 $76,476,000 $43,807,000 $2,457
1992 28,134 $2,760,000 $0 $98
1997 26,149 $13,391,000 $21,455,000 $1,333
 
 
Johnstown  2002 23,906 $7,196,000 $0 $301
1992 55,551 $8,250,000 $0 $149
1997 53,597 $23,575,000 $0 $440
 
 
Lancaster  2002 56,348 $72,276,000 $0 $1,283
1992 24,800 $1,470,000 $6,775,000 $332 
Lebanon  1997 23,791 $1,490,000 $0 $63
1992 26,016 $2,720,000 $0 $105
1997 23,343 $1,672,000 $0 $72
 
 
McKeesport  2002 24,040 $22,129,000 $0 $921
1992 28,334 $3,615,000 $0 $128 
New Castle  1997 26,845 $4,275,000 $0 $159
1992 15,894 $2,060,000 $0 $130
1997 15,233 $1,857,000 $0 $122
 
 
New Kensington  2002 14,701 $820,000 $28,000 $58
1992 1,585,577 $1,181,982,000 $2,556,528,000 $2,358
1997 1,478,002 $511,564,000 $2,911,223,000 $2,316
 
 
Philadelphia  2002 1,517,550 $866,559,000 $4,291,136,000 $3,399
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Appendix 5 (continued).  Municipal Debt Per Capita 
Name Year 4 Population FFC NG 
Debt 
Per 
Capita 
1992 369,879 $413,425,000 $247,394,000 $1,787
1997 350,363 $579,210,000 $218,424,000 $2,277
 
 
Pittsburgh  2002 334,563 $852,821,000 $277,142,000 $3,377
1992 78,380 $43,500,000 $0 $555
1997 75,723 $62,922,000 $29,433,000 $1,220
 
 
Reading  2002 81,207 $107,322,000 $3,165,000 $1,361
1992 81,805 $6,030,000 $0 $74
1997 77,189 $4,685,000 $0 $61
 
 
Scranton  2002 76,415 $26,760,000 $0 $350
1992 17,493 $749,000 $17,612,000 $1,050
1997 16,766 $5,102,000 $10,863,000 $952
 
 
Sharon  2002 16,328 $12,612,000 $0 $772
1992 47,523 $0 $8,740,000 $184 
Wilkes-Barre  1997 44,407 $5,031,000 $0 $113
1992 42,192 $14,704,000 $4,860,000 $464 
York  1997 40,779 $43,339,000 $0 $1,063
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Appendix 6.  Accrued Liabilities of Municipal Pensions – FY 2003 
Name 
Unfunded 
Liabilities Name 
Unfunded 
Liabilities 
Allentown  $6,599,940 New Castle $14,522,910
Altoona  $16,048,774 New Kensington  $2,439,363
Bethlehem  $37,871,857 Philadelphia  $2,668,092,020
Carbondale  $4,016,673 Pittsburgh  $454,291,957
Coatesville $778,073 Reading  $30,638,360
Erie  $22,195,388 Scranton  $79,491,161
Harrisburg  -$22,795,335 Sharon  -$529,605
Johnstown  $18,704,396 Wilkes-Barre $3,256,264
Lancaster  $3,157,135 York  $8,674,960
Lebanon  $3,102,094 TOTAL $3,333,461,592
McKeesport  $5,553,921  
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